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The ambivalence of self-care can be understood in terms of its simultaneous link to the social 
reproduction of neoliberal governmentality, and its pragmatic value. On the one hand, the 
notion that one’s physical and mental health must be taken up as a project to be invested in for 
the purposes of capitalisation, is both reliant on, and contributes to, the hegemonic status of 
neoliberal notions of subjectivity. On the other hand, since individuals and communities face 
enormous precarity, and given the continual defunding of health and mental health services as 
a result of austerity policies, self-care appears as an increasingly valuable form of maintenance 
and survival for the contemporary capitalist subject. Accordingly, it is tempting to try to 
demarcate self-care from other forms of political action that do not contribute to neoliberal 
hegemony. If self-care involves an inward-looking and depoliticised subject, surely political 
emancipation lies elsewhere. The possibility of some alternative to our present state of affairs, 
where self-care increasingly appears as a form of ‘voluntary servitude,’ that is to say, as a form 
of self-subjugation with serious political risks, must surely be taken as a continual project for 
those engaged in critical inquiry. Then again, to suggest that those engaging in self-care are 
simply reproducing neoliberal subjectivity would surely miss the ways in which such forms of 
self-preservation might appear as unavoidable for the individuals in question. As Sara Ahmed 
has put it, ‘some have to look after themselves because they are not looked after: their being is 
not cared for, supported, protected’.1
In light of this tension, this paper will explore both the ways in which the practices of 
self-care, specifically related to mental health, have emerged as responses to the increasingly 
precarious status of life after the economic shocks of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 
whilst also looking to the work of Silvia Federici and Kathi Weeks to propose models for 
immanent critique. Although it cannot be taken as a pure origin, post-GFC mental health 
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discourse has increasingly seen mental health discussed as a form of resilience to precarity. 
Furthermore, practices of self-care, and psychological forms of treatment such as cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) have become vehicles for the intensification of personal resilience 
in the face of systemic crisis. The work of Federici and Weeks will be drawn on to develop a 
means for thinking through critiques of mental health self-care that do not take self-care as a 
phenomena that can only be resisted through immediate rejection. Rather than positing self-
care as absolutely or essentially compromised, their work will be drawn upon to develop an 
immanent critique of self-care that acknowledges the pragmatic value of such practices, whilst 
it simultaneously critiques any notion of their ideological neutrality or organic inevitability. 
Through an engagement with their work—and one that draws parallels between their strategic 
critiques of reproductive labour broadly speaking, and the more specific area of mental illness 
and neoliberal governmentality—the question of the ‘necessity’ of self-care will be brought into 
alignment with the possibilities of its practicality. 
Mental Health as Resilience 
The injunction to be not only optimistic, but also happy in the face of what seems to be the 
systemic failure of the global financial system can be seen as wedded to the contemporary rise 
and ubiquity of the concept of ‘resilience,’ a concept that places an emphasis on individuals to 
overcome negative experiences caused by systemic crises. In his article ‘Resisting Resilience’, 
the philosopher and political theorist Mark Neocleous argues that over the last decade the 
concept of resilience has become
one of the key political categories of our time. It falls easily from the mouths of politicians, a 
variety of state departments are funding research into it, urban planners are now obliged to 
take it into consideration, and academics are falling over themselves to conduct research on it.2
Neocleous argues that ‘resilience’ has become a crucial concept in international relations, 
security and counter-terrorism, climate science, and economics, insofar as preparation for an 
imminent crisis—whether in terms of security, economy, or ecology—has become a key feature 
of contemporary governance.3 Neocleous further links the current ubiquity of the concept of 
resilience to contemporary forms of governance when he turns to the production of ‘resilient 
subjects’ in the wake of increasingly ‘insecure’ nation-states and a precarious global capitalism.4 
On Neocleous’s account, the ‘good’ resilient subject must be able to ‘survive and thrive in any 
situation’, be able to find a ‘balance’ between working ‘several insecure and part-time jobs’, 
and have an almost limitless capacity to ‘overcome life’s hurdles’ such as ‘facing retirement 
without a pension […] cuts to benefits, wage freezes or global economic meltdown’.5 
Indeed, Neocleous goes as far as stating that ‘neoliberal citizenship’ can be made effectively 
synonymous with ‘a training in resilience as the new technology of the self: a training to 
withstand whatever crisis capital undergoes and whatever political measures the state carries 
out to save it’.6 Such training is not limited to the functioning of traditional institutions of 
power. As the philosopher Robin James has shown in Resilience and Melancholy: Pop Music, 
Feminism, Neoliberalism, contemporary popular culture is awash with representations of 
resilience, or what James refers to as ‘Look, I Overcame!’ moments where ‘good’ subjectivities 
are constructed on the basis of a capacity for exhibiting the individual qualities of self-mastery 
and resilience to systemic violence.7 For James, contemporary popular music produced by 
figures such as Lady Gaga and Beyoncé—and we can also add contemporary advertising such 
as Dove’s ‘Real Beauty’ campaign—function to interpellate those who most frequently suffer 
from systemic violence—e.g., women, people of colour, and queer people—with the necessity 
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of being resilient in an inhospitable world.8 Taking the example of the production of the 
resilient female subject, such cultural texts present women as being damaged by patriarchy—
physically, emotionally, or both—but then position the viewer to accept a resilient and defiant 
response as being the appropriate way to achieve the status of a ‘good’ feminist subject.9 This 
is not to say that empowerment or resilience does not actually produce subjects better suited 
to systemic violence, but, instead, that these neoliberal or resilient subjects can become better 
suited to inhospitable conditions only through the inhibition of their capacity to organise 
politically and refuse mechanisms of governmentality. ‘Resilience wants acquiescence, not 
resistance’, writes Neocleous, and whilst the logic of resilience certainly demands that the 
subject be active, this activity must function so as to accommodate ‘capital and the state, and 
the secure future of both, rather than to resist them’.10 Indeed, the risk that the injunction 
to be resilient poses is that, in producing subjects who are suited to prolonged periods of 
precariousness and instability, the contemporary discourse of resilience will function to 
dissimulate, if not efface, forms of exploitation, subjugation, and control. 
This general privileging of resilience as a significant component of neoliberal ideology 
has many parallels to the ways in which resilience has been conceptualised in critical studies 
of mental health therapy and policy. For example, David Harper and Ewen Speed write of 
the promotion of resilience within mental health discourse as being intimately connected to 
‘neoliberal notions of individual responsibility’.11 For these authors, the difficulty presented 
by the resilience model is the way that it frames the struggles of those suffering from 
mental illness as disparate individuals in need of greater recognition, as opposed to potential 
collectives in a struggle around more equitable distribution of public goods.12 The language 
of resilience speaks to a very specific notion of recovery, one that is ‘a highly individualised 
and experiential concept’ and that entails a framework ‘based on individual changes to 
attitudes, behaviours and beliefs by the psychiatric patient’.13 While the language of resilience 
and its concomitant notion of recovery are often championed because of their emphasis on 
pragmatic solutions and their aversion to notions of deficiency or weakness, Harper and Speed 
argue that such neoliberal emphasis on the individual and their capacity to recover through 
becoming more resilient ‘invite people to see certain problems as the responsibility of the 
individual rather than, for example, the State’.14 One of the dangers presented by the successful 
interpellation of those experiencing existential suffering—such as depression or anxiety—as 
being atomised individuals that need to adjust their own attitudes and beliefs, is the way in 
which it can depoliticise issues that require systemic intervention. For example, Guy Standing 
has commented on the ways in which Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) was used in the 
United Kingdom in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.15 As Standing argues, rather 
than attending to the structural issues that were significantly contributing to depression, 
anxiety, and stress—especially those around precarious work—CBT was used a means of 
helping people to live in a world of increased uncertainty.16 Manualised treatments like CBT 
help to encourage a view that grasps the precarity caused by systemic crisis as requiring an 
individual and personal response in which one transforms to become more resilient in the face 
of adversity. While they do not speak about CBT per se, there is a link between such popular 
forms of therapy and the broader trend identified by Harper and Ewen, one that ‘makes 
emotional distress an explicit problem of individualised identity, rather than for example, an 
effect of structural inequality’.17
The resilience model accordingly involves a replacement of State intervention—into 
markets, labour supply, provision of housing and medical treatment—with a model of 
individuals recognising their emotional anguish as being an individual problem that requires 
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self-management and self-care.18 As Harper and Speed argue, such ‘self-care’ is ‘tightly aligned 
with neoliberal forms of government’ insofar as they entail an increased control over the lives 
of individuals, as such lives are deemed to no longer be the responsibility of the state.19 In 
certain situations such modes of self-care, as become manifest in treatments like CBT, are 
unavoidable for those in precarious situations. As William Davies states, the UK government 
announced in 2014 that ‘disability benefit claimants could have their payments stopped if they 
refused to attend sessions of CBT’.20 Nevertheless, even if there are not direct injunctions 
provided by the state for self-care and self-management to be used as means of becoming 
more resilient to precariousness and crisis, the broader success of biological models for 
psychiatry—or ‘biopsychiatry’—has increasingly led to a situation in which, as Davies puts it, 
‘as laypeople, we come to attribute our failures and sadness to our brains and our troublesome 
minds’ as opposed to locating them in a shared political context.21 As the psychiatrist Joanna 
Moncrieff has argued, over the last few decades the theory of ‘chemical imbalances’ has 
emerged as a means of explaining a host of psychiatric disorders.22 What is striking, for 
Moncrieff, is that such a theory is so widespread and popular given the very marginal evidence 
that exists to support it.23 As she writes, ‘like ordinary mental and physical activity, psychiatric 
disturbances will be mirrored in the brain. However, unlike neurological disorders, there is no 
evidence as yet that there are discrete and specific anatomical or functional defects associated 
with the vast majority of what we label as mental illness’.24,25 Despite this lack of evidence, 
the enormous influence of pharmaceutical manufacturers has helped to promote the now 
incredibly popular idea that mental illnesses are both caused by ‘chemical imbalances,’ and 
that ‘anti-depressants’ and similar drugs—such as neuroleptics or ‘anti-psychotics’—can offer 
disease-specific forms of treatment. As Moncrieff indicates, campaigns such as the ‘Defeat 
Depression Campaign,’ organised in the United Kingdom and run by the Royal Collage of 
Psychiatrists, functioned to promote the message that ‘depression was an under-recognised 
problem’ and one that required greater levels of diagnosis and pharmaceutical treatment.26 
Campaigns like ‘Defeat Depression,’ which was partly funded by Eli Lilly—the makers of 
Prozac—have helped to greatly increase the sales of ‘anti-depressants’ and to popularise the 
notion of a bio-chemical cause for phenomena such as depression and anxiety.27
If mental illness is seen as a personal problem, an individual and bio-chemical defect, then 
it makes sense that the state would become increasingly separate from questions about what 
makes life difficult. The injunction to engage in self-care and self-management, and the notion 
that increased resilience is the appropriate response to environmental stresses and existential 
anguish produce the stark possibility of a depoliticised and atomised sufferer who views a 
better life as only emerging through increased introspection and compliance. Furthermore, 
by providing an injunction for the subject of resilience discourse to view themselves as 
responsible for their own existential and emotional suffering, the kinds of self-care and self-
management that increasingly obscure systemic causes for suffering come to seem natural 
and spontaneous. As the contemporary theorist Maurizio Lazzarato has argued, the extreme 
individualism of our contemporary neoliberal social formations see ‘frustration, resentment, 
guilt, and fear’ feature as dominant affects.28 For Lazzarato, such affects are ubiquitous in 
neoliberal social formations because ‘the promise of self-realisation, freedom, and autonomy 
collide with a reality that systemically nullifies them’.29 However, on Lazzarato’s account, such 
a contradiction between the promise of autonomy and freedom—as might be encouraged 
by the neoliberal injunction to realise oneself through seemingly endless processes of self-
management, self-improvement, and self-care—does not tend towards a radical disjuncture or 
break with the ideological conditions that spur it on. Instead, as Lazzarato states, any volatility 
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produced through such a conflict is dampened ‘through the interiorization of the conflict: the 
“enemy” becomes indistinguishable from a part of the self ’.30 For this reason, it is important 
to critique this injunction to be proactive, to take control, to take oneself in hand and to take 
one’s life as an object of responsibility—situated as it is within a system tending towards 
repeated ecological, economic, and political crises—in order to expose it as a form of work 
that, regardless of its seemingly necessary or inevitable status, is in the last instance imposed by 
an arbitrary and plastic economic and political situation. Indeed, while individuals may simply 
have no choice in their singular contexts but to comply with or acquiesce to such injunctions 
it is important to associate them with other forms of emotional or affective labour that do not 
arise spontaneously but are intimately connected to ideological imperatives towards ever great 
utility and productivity.
Self-Care as Work
In the introduction to their paper ‘The Role of Health Capital in Health Promotion’, Hyry-
Honka, Määtä, and Uusuiautti comment that one could 
ask any man or woman on the street to name the most important three things in their lives 
and one of their choices would be health. Everyone appreciates health and wishes they would 
stay healthy for their whole life span. What things does health consist of then? How can one 
cherish it? What promotes health? Are there some factors that one could gather in order to 
improve health and that would ‘pay dividend?’31
Despite its ambiguous ontological status, it would indeed be difficult to imagine many 
phenomena that could replace health as one of the central elements of human life. 
Nevertheless, it is important to question the way that health—and particularly our mental 
health or well-being—is framed within influential theoretical discourses and by powerful 
institutions. The notion that mental health is a form of capital—that it is a kind of ‘health 
capital’ or that it is to be understood as ‘mental wealth’—has gained increased traction over 
the last decade. As the latter scholars indicate, one of the central transformations introduced 
by the shift from a discussion of mental health to mental wealth, or health capital, is the 
introduction of questions pertaining to a dividend or a return on investment. Broadly speaking, 
the notion of ‘mental wealth’ suggests two potential investors that should expect a return on 
investments in improved emotional and cognitive resilience. Firstly, the nation-state itself is 
viewed as a potential benefactor from investment in mental wealth. As Beddington, Cooper, 
et al. have stated, commenting on the importance of investing in ‘mental capital in childhood 
and adolescence’, early intervention by states ‘can increase [children’s] resilience to stress 
and common mental disorders. Later in life, this resilience helps to engender well-being at 
work and into old-age’.32 From this perspective, the state is one of the potential recipients of 
dividend due to its capacity to extend the tax-paying function of its citizens into later life, and 
to potentially lower the necessity for expensive public services associated with common mental 
illnesses—depression, anxiety, etc. Secondly, the notion of mental wealth posits the individual 
as a potential recipient of such a dividend insofar as they too will suffer from fewer financial 
burdens and will find potential for ‘self-fulfilment’.33
This second view, that of the individual as investor in their own mental wealth, or health 
capital, is very much aligned with dominant modes of subjectivity formed through the 
continued dominance of neoliberal ideology. Particularly in Foucauldian analysis, neoliberal 
subjectivity is to be ‘revealed’ by shifting our perspective away from the Marxist and classical 
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liberal view of capital as object. As Andrew Dilts has summarised, in these traditions, labour is 
always something 
purchased on a market, or tied to the production of a specific commodity. It is never thought 
of as one human activity amongst others that individuals might (and here is the key move) 
choose over other activities.34
In Foucault’s analysis, Dilts argues, neoliberalism entails an epistemological shift that ‘reveals’ 
what was once seen as an economic object to be a subject possible of choice.35 Although Dilts 
points out that the neoliberal theorists in question—whether Hayek, Friedman, Schultz, or 
Beck—don’t necessarily use this kind of language, Foucault is still fundamentally correct 
when he writes that the neoliberal perspective seeks to show the worker as ‘an active economic 
subject’.36 Accordingly, while both the state and the individual can be viewed as potential 
benefactors from an investment in mental wealth, or health capital, the dominant neoliberal 
ideology—with its emphasis on the individual as requiring increased resilience in the face 
of systemic uncertainty and precarity—places emphasis on the individual as the prime 
beneficiary, and therefore the prime investor. As Patrick McGorry has indicated, although 
past world leaders such as the former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull have 
‘warmly embraced’ the term ‘mental wealth’, there is still a significant lack of investment in 
mental health services.37 While McGorry indicates that, mental illness ‘poses the greatest 
threat to economic and social development of nations’ the actual investment in treatment and 
mental health care is still significantly low.38 A potential reason for this disparity, between, 
on the one hand, the acknowledgement that mental illness poses an enormous future cost to 
national productivity, and, on the other hand, that governments are not willing to invest in 
services to help patients, is that the individual sufferers in question are increasingly viewed 
as the ones needing to invest, given that they are viewed as the primary future beneficiaries. 
As Esposito and Perez have argued, neoliberal ideology sees ‘notions of normalcy and/or 
sanity as commodities to be bought, sold, and profited from’.39 For this reason, the notion that 
individuals should look to the state to help with the improvement of their individual mental 
wealth—their individual capital that they can choose to improve and profit from—sits at odds 
with dominant ideas about the active subjectivity of the worker. Placed alongside the bio-
chemical model that sees mental illnesses such as depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia, as 
individual problems curable only through medication, the notion that mental health is a form 
of capital for the individual to invest in greatly obscures the systemic economic and political 
factors that should be viewed as inseparable from the discourse of mental illness and existential 
suffering. 
Rather than such systemic economic and political factors being made a meaningful part 
of our discussions about such suffering, forms of self-care are increasingly presented as 
the only practical solutions to mental illness and emotional and existential anguish. As an 
example of this increasingly dominant tendency, we can look to Gill and Donaghue’s work 
on the promotion of resilience and ‘mindfulness’ in contemporary universities. As the authors 
argue, ‘complete physical and mental collapse seems to be the “elephant in the room” in most 
settings within the academy’.40 Given that academics in the UK are reported to work an extra 
‘9 hours per week’ or, put differently, to work for free ‘for three months of the year’, it is not 
surprising that many suffer from immense levels of stress, depression, and anxiety.41 Instead of 
collective or systemic analysis being used to engage with the crises wrought by the effects of 
an increasingly casualised and precarious workforce, the solutions implemented are typically 
‘individualised tools’ that necessitate ‘an enterprising, self managed and “responsibilised” subject 
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who can “manage time,” “manage change,” and “manage stress,” demonstrate resilience, practice 
mindfulness, etc’.42 Popular ‘resilience workshops’, offered to meet the ever increasingly 
reportage of staff suffering from depression and anxiety, and function as the ‘perfect training 
for life in neoliberalism, offering technologies of selfhood for dealing with uncertainty, 
precariousness, stress, [and] crisis’.43 Rather than such strategies for increased resilience 
offering the possibility of resistant subjects, their tendency to emphasise the individual and the 
psychological over the political intensifies the need to question and critique such ‘work on the 
self ’, and its inability to help us move towards real alternatives to present mental illness and 
emotional suffering.44
Reproductive Labour
Over the last few decades, one of the important roles taken up by critical theorists has been 
to show the extent to which unpaid reproductive labour is required to maintain capital’s 
demands for increased productivity. While conventional wisdom still holds a division between 
our personal and working lives—or between our emotional ‘inner world,’ and our professional 
‘outer world’—the critical discussion of cognitive, affective, and reproductive labour has 
attempted to show the extent to which these domains have become increasingly blurred.
For example, while it would be impossible to separate emotions entirely from the labour 
process, there are nevertheless increasing forms of employment in which displays of pleasure, 
happiness, or enjoyment can no longer be deemed as unnecessary or superfluous to the ‘proper’ 
functioning of the employee. Workers in low-paid positions, such as fast food workers, are 
burdened with the expectation to simulate and perform feelings of happiness and frivolity 
in their interactions with customers and other workers. In his text Willing Slaves of Capital: 
Spinoza and Marx on Desire, the economist Frédéric Lordon discusses the neoliberal ‘girlfriend 
experience’,45 a phrase used to refer to the increased expectation for workers to engage in 
emotional labour. As an example of this phenomenon, Lordon writes of Indian call-centre 
workers who are expected to learn the accents, idioms, and culture of their foreign clients so as 
to make themselves more relatable and therefore to improve the overall customer experience.46 
He writes further that some employees are becoming enjoined to ‘completely surrender their 
affectivity’ in their work, insofar as they are asked to ‘laugh or play games on command’.47
Examples of emotional labour are not restricted to non-Western workers, however. In 
early 2015 the McDonald’s fast food company launched its ‘Pay With Lovin’’ campaign, 
in which customers were opened up to the random chance of receiving their meal for free 
on the condition that they were willing to perform an act of happiness such as high-fiving 
the staff, singing, dancing, or calling a family member and confessing their love for them 
in-store. However, and as the journalist Bryce Covert notes, such emotional labour is not 
simply being passed on to the customer, since it would be almost inconceivable to imagine 
McDonald’s tolerating their staff resisting this performed happiness by remaining deadpan 
or by even looking uncomfortable whilst a customer danced or expressed their love for their 
mother in order to attain free food.48 Similarly, Paul Myerscough writes in the London Review 
of Books that the sandwich chain Pret A Manger employs ‘mystery shoppers’ for the purpose 
of monitoring the perceived happiness of employees, and to allow the company to reward 
and punish employees based on their capacity to imbue their work with the correct affects of 
happiness and jubilation.49
This increased need to show a symmetry between one’s well-being and one’s working 
existence raises concerns about the increased potential for self-care—especially in response 
to mental illness—to become inextricably bound to logics of utility and productivity. If 
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contemporary subjects of medical and pharmacological discourse continue to view themselves 
as sufferers of individual and bio-chemical disorders, why would they be willing to oppose 
or seek alternatives to disciplinary injunctions to engage in self-care? Will a more systemic 
view, and one that might engender collective political emancipation, become increasingly 
obscured by such perspectives? Unfortunately it seems that these possibilities are real risks, 
and, accordingly, one task of critical theory must be to expose the manner by which self-
care functions to reproduce neoliberal forms of subjectivity—entrepreneurial, individualistic, 
competitive—and to intensify market ideology. That being said, it would also be naive—if 
not reckless—for critical theorists to suggest that self-care should simply be abandoned 
by individuals—due to its complicity with neoliberal capital—insofar as such individuals 
may be existentially dependent on such forms of care. Indeed, and to return to the work of 
Sara Ahmed mentioned earlier in this article, for a great number of marginalised people, 
self-care is not simply the only form of care-available, but is can also be understood as an 
act of defiance against a hostile state or structure50—e.g., patriarchy, white supremacism, or 
heteronormativity. For this reason, it is vital that the tension internal to self-care is maintained, 
and that its emphasis on individualism and resilience is not given precedence over its necessity. 
Accordingly, in order to maintain such a tension in our conceptualisation of the problem 
of self-care for mental illness, we will turn in the next section to ideas that emerged out of 
work by 1970s feminists such as Silvia Federici in order to locate an appropriate theoretical 
vocabulary for working with and against self-care and its individualising effects. Since Federici 
critically analysed the ways in which women are socially conditioned to perform reproductive 
labour without recognition or compensation, her work is incredibly useful for drawing parallels 
between the reproductive labour performed by those suffering from mental illness.51 By 
engaging with her work we will be able to better address the possibility of discussing self-care 
for mental illness as a form of work that should be critiqued.
Wages for Self-Care
For Federici, writing in the 1970s, sites of domesticity needed to become vital spaces of 
struggle for the radical left. As she argues, capitalist ideology has cast the reproductive labour 
of the housewife52 as a natural phenomenon, an internal need on the part of women to be 
nurturing, and an a phenomenon external to the wage-relation.53 Not only is housework 
deemed to be something that women are simply predisposed to wanting to complete, but, 
furthermore, the role that housework has in ensuring that workers are trained and equipped 
for a life of work is rendered invisible. The significance of reproductive labour is outlined by 
Federici when she argues that,
It is not an accident, then, if most men start thinking of getting married as soon as they 
get their first job. This is not only because now they can afford it, but also because having 
somebody at home who takes care of you is the only condition of not going crazy after a day 
spent on an assembly line or at a desk.54
Accordingly, it is clear that her analysis of reproductive labour already contains within it a 
consideration of the way in which unpaid work—divided along clear gendered and racial 
lines—is necessary for the proper existential functioning of the worker. The housewife is there, 
on Federici’s account, to 
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service the male worker physically, emotionally, and sexually, to raise his children, mend 
his socks, patch up his ego when it is crushed by the work and the social relations (which are 
relations of loneliness) that capital has reserved for him.55
From Federici’s argument, we can claim that it is not simply the case that the housewife 
attends to the emotional survival of the individual worker. Without the housewife there to 
help the worker to negotiate the emotional suffering that is caused by work—stress, loneliness, 
boredom, anxiety, etc.—capital would not be able to increase its productivity. As Federici 
states herself, ‘housework is much more than house cleaning. It is servicing the wage earners 
physically, emotionally, sexually, getting them ready for work day after day’.56
Having argued that, by way of their reproductive labour, the housewife produces ‘the most 
precious product to appear on the capitalist market: labour power’,57 Federici states that there 
is a need for the production of a new ‘revolutionary perspective’ offered by the demand for 
wages for housework.58 This perspective hoped to introduce the notion that the reproductive 
labour performed by housewives is a form of work and is not a result of an inner-calling or 
spontaneous desire. Furthermore, the demand for wages was not an attempt to elevate or 
‘dignify’ housework in such a way as to find a fair compensation for it, but was instead, as 
Federici argues, ‘the first step towards refusing to do it’.59 As Kathi Weeks has contended, it 
is vital to maintain the ‘demand’ of wages for housework alongside the notion of ‘perspective’, 
insofar as this demand ‘could function as a force of demystification, an instrument of 
denaturalisation, and a tool of cognitive mapping’.60 The demand of wages for housework was 
intended as a means for women to better situate their lived experience within exploitative 
social structures so as to be better equipped to challenge them. Beyond merely being a demand 
for payment, the perspective of wages for housework could offer the chance to provide a 
clearer sense of the role of the housewife under capital, suggest that other forms of activity 
should be undertaken by women, and could help to elucidate the ways in which reproductive 
labour functioned to produce the labour-power that ideological mystification presented as 
being independent of the care of the housewife. Importantly, however, such a demystification, 
denaturalisation, and potential for critique does not entail a destruction of individual meaning 
or dignity. Federici recalls that, 
even now, some of my most treasured memories of my childhood are of my mother making 
bread, pasta, tomato sauce, pies, liqueurs, and then knitting, sewing, mending, embroidering, 
and attending to her plants. […] As a child, I saw her work; later, as a feminist, I learned to 
see her struggle, and I realised how much love there had been in that work, and yet how costly 
it had been for my mother to see it so often taken for granted, to never be able to dispose some 
money of her own, and to always have to depend on my father for every penny she spent.61
For Federici, the meaning experienced by caring for one’s family and for oneself—as with 
the example of her mother—does not have to be elided by the perspective of wages for house 
work. It is not simply a matter of rejecting all affection, love, or care as being repressive and 
therefore to be avoided. This perspective, rather than working with a totalising exclusion of 
specific practices maintains reproductive labour as having the potential for both bestowing 
meaning and being inextricably bound to the functioning of capital. While an individual 
can, and in many cases must find meaning in such care work, the danger lies in viewing it 
as natural, unavoidable, and detached from systemic power. Rather than placing increased 
pressure on the individual to view introspective work-on-the-self as the only vehicle for 
political action, Federici’s writing is able to insist that one make a life for themselves under 
capital, as they understand that the form of one’s life is not natural or inevitable. 
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It is in this sense that wages for housework can serve as a source of inspiration for a similar 
perspective and demand relating to the work of self-care performed by sufferers of mental illness. 
A demand for wages for self-care would not simply involve stating that the wage-relation should 
encroach on yet another aspect of our lives, nor that a wage would be in and of itself a solution to 
the problems of precarity and their concomitant affects of depression, anxiety, and despair. Instead, 
the hope would be to try and further a perspective of demystification, denaturalisation, and 
critique that helps us to understand how the experience of mental illness is intimately connected 
to the kinds of inequality that neoliberal hegemony both produces and obscures. Just as Federici 
helped to challenge the notion that housework was a natural consequence of female biology—i.e., 
a natural instinct to nurture—so too must we challenge the notion that neoliberal self-care is a 
natural consequence of the biology of those suffering with mental illness. While it might seem 
inevitable that the mentally ill seek out individualised forms of treatment—as they are often the 
only ones available—a perspective of viewing self-care as reproductive labour, helps us to situate 
the experience of mental illness within the structural exploitation of neoliberal capital.
Federici’s writing does not present the critical response to reproductive labour as requiring 
a purely negative stance of rejection and renunciation. Instead, in her work we find a means 
for negotiating the ambivalence of self-care that this paper began with. Rather than thinking 
normatively about self-care, and whether the subject of neoliberal governance should embrace 
or resist self-care, we can utilise a perspective that locates the political in collective processes 
of demystification. Or, put differently, the critique of self-care for mental illness does not 
require an injunction for the mentally ill to view resistance to neoliberal governance as another 
project of self-cultivation. Once it takes a moral tone of judgement, the observation that the 
marginalised people who suffer the most under neoliberal capital are often the most complicit 
with its ideology does little to further emancipatory politics. Accordingly, instead of promoting 
introspective worry about whether or not a certain technique of self-care—be it resilience 
training, mindfulness meditation, or CBT—makes one more or less complicit with capital, the 
possibility should present itself of both caring for the self and demanding that such care be 
recognised as a form of work that can be collectively opposed and changed. To take seriously 
the tensions highlighted by Ahmed, and to draw inspiration from Federici, and contemporary 
champions of her work such as Weeks, means to critique any theoretical gaze that can only 
locate the self as the primary source of suffering when it poses questions about self-care under 
neoliberalism. In so doing, we can, as Federici and many other feminists like her have done, 
collectively question the true length of the working day, and the extent to which the reproduction 
of capital goes beyond the labour calculated by economists. Work has never ended when the 
wage-relation is suspended, and this is also true for those that suffer with mental illness. Indeed, 
it is by understanding that capital is always locating new ways to utilise reproductive labour—
such as mental health self-care—for its own ends that there is the possibility of producing new 
emancipatory and collective political struggles.
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